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This dissertation consists of two essays on finance and experimental economics.
The first essay studies the dynamic portfolio optimization problem with reinforcement learning.
I evaluate several algorithms on simulated data to document their convergence properties and
sample efficiencies. I also apply a state-of-the-art algorithm on two empirical problems and show
that they outperform other traditional strategies.
The second essay studies alternating bargaining games, by proposing an ultimatum game with
uncertainties. I model the two-stage game as a screening game that incorporates the social factor of
fairness, and run experiments to analyze how participants behave in response to bargaining power
shift.
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This dissertation aims to understand behaviors, including behaviors of artificial intelligence by
building a reinforcement learning agent for trading, and behaviors of human by implementing a
bargaining game experiment.
The first essay tackles the dynamic portfolio optimization problem with modern reinforcement
learning techniques. I use simulation to investigate convergence and sample efficiencies of several
types of model-free learning algorithms, and apply a state-of-the-art approach on two empirical
problems of trading. Model-free approaches are more flexible for learning based on interactions with
the environment. We aim to fill the gap in the literature that reinforcement learning algorithms
are not evaluated on the portfolio problem in terms of their convergence property which is crucial
in financial applications since the observational data is limited. In the empirical part, we train
the models with two problems, index trading and statistical arbitrage. The reinforcement learning
agent outperforms both prediction-based and pairs trading strategies, with higher Sharpe ratios
and terminal values.
The second essay studies the alternating offer bargaining game. I propose a two-stage bargain-
ing with explicit uncertainties of bargaining power shift, motivated by the fact that people perceive
bargaining as a stochastic decision problem, instead of a shrinking size problem as typically mod-
eled in the literature to capture impatience. To explain possible social factors such as fairness
in bargaining, I build a screening game model in which participants are heterogeneous in terms of
attitudes towards fairness, and their uninformed opponents have to make decisions based on conjec-
tures. The model predicts some patterns of the experimental data. We observe that fairs deals are
achieved for most participants, whereas the distributions shift as uncertainties change. Simulation
shows that making fair offers indeed brings the highest expected payoffs. The essay documents the
2
behaviors when facing unbalance bargaining powers, and the phenomenon that fairness appears to
be a robust factor in various scenarios of social interactions.
3
CHAPTER 2. DYNAMIC PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION WITH
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Shirui Wang, Kuaishou Technology
Modified from a manuscript to be submitted to Journal of Computational Finance
Abstract
This study demonstrates the convergence and sample efficiencies of value-based, policy-based
and actor-critic reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms on portfolio optimization. We focus
on actor-critic models for continuous control, and evaluate state-of-the-art approaches to two
empirical applications, namely index trading and statistical arbitrage. With macroeconomic
and technical predictors for S&P500 as in Neely et al. (2014), RL outperforms prediction-based
portfolio and the portfolios with historical estimates. By trading the price spreads for statistical
arbitrage, RL also outperforms the pairs trading strategy.
2.1 Introduction
Markowitz (1952) introduced modern portfolio theory. The static approach and its variants
still dominate in practice, since they are intuitive and easy to implement. However, these meth-
ods are notoriously sensitive to errors and rely on distributional assumptions. DeMiguel et al.
(2009) shows that they can’t even beat a simple equal-weight portfolio out-of-sample. Samuelson
(1969) and Merton (1969) extend the myopic problem to multiple periods and solve the dynamic
consumption-investment problem with CRRA preferences using dynamic programming. With iid
returns, analytic solutions exist and resemble the myopic solutions. With predictability, the so-
lution deviates by the so-called hedging demand, the closed form solutions exist only for several
utility functions.
Solving discrete time models generally requires numerical dynamic programming. The states
and actions need to be discretized, and state transition dynamics need to be estimated. (e.g.
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Brandt et al. (2005)). With multiple assets and continuous portfolio weights, the computational
cost is huge. Alternative to dynamic programming which needs to model the transition dynamics,
reinforcement learning (RL henceforth) algorithms allow us to solve for the policy in a model-
free manner, and accommodate continuous state/action spaces. Human knowledge can also be
incorporated by modeling the transition dynamics to aid learning (model-based RL). This also has
an advantage over prediction based optimization, since end-to-end training may reduce prediction
errors. (Moody and Saffell (2001))
The seminal studies that utilized RL into a portfolio optimization problem are Moody et al.
(1998) and Moody and Saffell (2001). They apply RL agents in the discrete action space and show
that they are profitable with simulated data. The state variables are past prices and the objec-
tive is to maximize risk-adjusted returns. They also show empirically that policy-based methods
outperform value-based methods on FX data.
More recent studies take advantage of neural networks as function approximators and more
efficient RL algorithms. For example, Deng et al. (2016) and Jiang et al. (2017) apply policy-based
methods with discrete or continuous actions, and show profitability using commodity futures and
cryptocurrencies data.
The results of these studies seem fruitful, but none of them evaluates sample-efficiency, which
is the crucial property of RL algorithms. This is especially important in financial data, since we
can only observe one realized trajectory of the data. Model-free methods have to rely on limited
data. It is necessary to understand how much data is required before establishing any meaningful
results and avoid overfitting. We aim to fill the gap by studying the convergence properties. In
particular, we are interested in whether RL agents can learn, and if so, how much data is required
for convergence. Another contribution to the literature is the information set for RL trading agents.
Previous studies use only price and volume data. In essence, this implies the belief that the market
is priced-in, such that prices and volumes can represent all available information. Given the recent
literature on return predictability of macroeconomic, fundamental and technical factors, we take
advantage of these available predictors to train the RL agent, and compare the performance with
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prediction-based strategies. In addition, we demonstrate another use case of RL in trading, that is
trading the spreads of asset pairs. We compare an RL strategy and the well-known pairs trading
strategy, with assets prices that are selected to exhibit mean reversion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on portfolio optimization and
other stochastic control problems in finance. Section 3 briefly introduces reinforcement learning
and some common algorithms. Section 4 defines the problem of interest. Section 5 runs simulations
with RL agents and investigates their convergence. Section 6 presents two empirical applications
of index trading and pairs trading. Section 7 concludes our research and discusses future work.
2.2 Literature Review
We review two sections of the literature. The first section identifies stochastic control problems
in finance and reviews how reinforcement learning, including portfolio optimization can be applied.
The second section provides a review of the research on the predictability of security returns,
evaluating the empirical data.
2.2.1 Stochastic Control Problems in Finance
The portfolio optimization problem is in essence a stochastic control problem. There are several
well-defined stochastic control problems in finance. We review some of them here.
Pricing and Hedging of Derivatives
The core idea of the classical Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing problem (Black and Scholes
(1973)) is portfolio replication. In a complete market, the payoff of the derivative can always be
replicated by a portfolio of risky and risk-free assets. By dynamically and continuously hedging
the portfolio, the derivative price should always resemble the portfolio value. This setting fits an
optimal control problem, where the objective is to track the portfolio value, and the policy maps
the observed states to the action i.e. the hedging position. Halperin (2020) is the first study that
applies reinforcement learning to the classical option pricing problem in discrete time and verifies
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that a simple Q-learner is able to find the optimal policy and value function, which are the optimal
hedging position and option price.
In an incomplete and realistic market, there are many frictions such as transaction costs, market
impact and liquidity constraints, and not all assets can be exactly replicated. In practice, traders
start with the complete market models and make ad-hoc adjustments. The choice of derivatives
for hedging is typically inconsistent. Optimization with dynamic programming is difficult due to
the curse of dimensionality and modeling. Buehler et al. (2019) proposes to solve the problem
with reinforcement learning. The approach is flexible, incorporates market information in a model-
free fashion, and is shown to outperform the solution based on complete market assumptions. A
continuous action application is Cao et al. (2019), which investigates assets with geometric Brownian
motion and stochastic volatility.
Optimal Exercise of American Options
American options are options that can be exercised before expiration. Finding the policy of
when to exercise options is a problem of optimal stopping time and can be formulated as an MDP.
The policy maps the underlying asset’s price as the state variable to the stopping time for exercising.
Pricing is also achieved once the policy is found. The reward function is naturally the present value
of the option payoffs.
A widely adopted approach is Longstaff and Schwartz (2001), which is based on Monte Carlo
simulations and uses regressions to fit continuation values for in-the-money states of the underlying
price. Li et al. (2009) proposes to solve the problem with reinforcement learning. In particular,
Least Squares Policy Iteration (LSPI) and Fitted Q-Iteration (FQI) are applied to approximate the
continuation value function. Larger payoffs are gained by reinforcement learning than the payoffs
from the Longstaff-Schwartz method.
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Optimal Trade Order Execution
Bertsimas and Lo (1998) is the seminal study of optimal trade order execution. Due to the
nature trading micro-structure, large orders affect the market price temporarily and permanently.
The optimal order placement has to take the impacts of large orders into account. A large order
is typically divided into small chunks, and submitted subsequently. This is a dynamic control
problem that aims to either maximize sales or minimize purchases, after adjusting for transaction
and liquidity costs. The observed states include time and shares left, and possibly some relevant
features of the order book.
Nevmyvaka et al. (2006) and Vyetrenko and Xu (2019) study the order execution problem with
reinforcement learning. Since the order book data are high-frequency and the orders need to fill
fast, speed is particularly desirable in the choice of algorithms.
Optimal Asset Allocation/Consumption
An investor who wants to diversify risks has to decide the optimal allocation of risky and risk-
free assets. Sometimes consumption, such as retirement planning is taken into account. In this
scenario, the actions to be optimized are portfolio weights and the consumption rate. The observed
states could include time, wealth, and possibly some return predictors. The environment is the
stochastic transition of asset returns.
This problem was first studied by Markowitz (1952) as a static problem. It is still prevalent,
along with its variants in the industry. Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) study the optimal
consumption / investment problem in discrete and continuous time, respectively. The analytical
solution to the dynamic problem only exists for some special cases (see Back (2010) for a survey).
Most model-based models need to utilize some numerical dynamic programming techniques to
accommodate the discrete state/action spaces. For example, Campbell et al. (2003) solves an infinite
horizon problem with the Epstein-Zin-Weil utility of intermediate consumptions. The returns are
also assumed to exhibit the mean-reversion behavior. Brandt et al. (2005) solves the problem with
predictable returns by expanding the value function. The method also utilizes simulation, using
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the estimated parameters to generate future paths, and fit the value function. Note that the idea
of simulation and fitting the value function can be applied to reinforcement learning as well. We
will review reinforcement learning in the later section.
The seminal studies by Moody et al. (1998) and Moody and Saffell (2001) propose to apply
reinforcement learning to portfolio optimization. They utilize ”direct reinforcement learning” which
is essentially a policy based and off-policy algorithm. The algorithm is shown to be more profitable
than value-based methods, and to avoid the curse of dimensionality. Model-free reinforcement
learning methods benefit from more precise function approximators, for both value and policy
functions. Recent development of hardware and more flexible techniques have boosted the revival
of neural networks, which were first introduced decades ago, as function approximators. Recent
applications of reinforcement learning in finance take advantage of neural networks. For example,
Jiang et al. (2017) utilizes CNN and RNN for policy functions and shows the profitability of a
reinforcement learning agent on the cryptocurrency market. The state variables are open, high,
low, close prices and volumes of the past periods. However, due to the short validation period, the
profitability needs to be further evaluated.
2.2.2 Return predictability
Merton (1980) called attempts to estimate the equity premium a ”fool’s errand”. The expected
returns were long believed to be constant over time, but it takes a very long period to estimate. Yet
there is an increasing literature on the predictability of equity premiums. For instance, Cochrane
(2008) demonstrates the joint predictability of returns and dividend growth. Moskowitz et al. (2012)
finds the past year market return predicts the next month return. Welch and Goyal (2008) examines
multiple macroeconomic factors and Neely et al. (2014) further includes technical indicators. At the
firm level, Green et al. (2017) studies 94 potential characteristics and identifies 12 reliable variables.
As machine learning methods are being introduced and recognized in the research community, Gu
et al. (2020) does a comprehensive analysis of a large set of stocks and features, using several
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popular supervised learning models. This study shows an improvement in predictability as a result
of these non-linear models.
2.3 A Brief Introduction to Reinforcement Learning
2.3.1 Introduction
Similar to dynamic programming (DP), reinforcement learning (RL) solves the Markov Decision
Process. The major difference is the usage of state transition models. DP methods make assump-
tions about the environment and derive the expectations parametrically. RL methods, however,
allow the agent to interact with the environment to collect samples of current and future states, ac-
tions, and immediate rewards. From the samples, the RL agent ”learns” the policy. The algorithms
can be classified based on what aspect of learning we focus.
The policy function can be directly fitted (policy-based), chosen based on the fitted value func-
tions (value-based), or based on both (actor-critic). It’s also possible to incorporate the estimated
or assumed transition models (model-based). The agent could learn based on the whole trajectories
of samples (Monte Carlo) or on the incomplete trajectories (temporal difference). It could learn
with the samples that are generated from the current policy (on-policy) or those generated by other
policies (off-policy).
When the transition dynamics are fully known to us, DP methods are preferred. Even if there
are no analytical solutions to the value or policy function, they can be approximated by some
functions. If the dynamics are unknown, DP may introduce modelling errors and model-free RL
methods could be more flexible. The main concerns of RL is the sample efficiency since learning
relies on the interactions of the agent with the environment. It’s not uncommon for an RL agent
to learn anything meaningful only after millions steps of interacting and updating.
Next we briefly review the Markov Decision Process (MDP) and the relevant notations.
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2.3.2 Markov Decision Process
We consider the setup of an agent interacting with an environment E with discrete steps, and
make finite-horizon decision. At each step the agent observes state St ∈ S, takes an action At ∈ A,
transits to the next state St+1 ∈ S, and receives a reward Rt ∈ R. The observed trajectory is then
summarized as τ = {S0, A0, S1, A1, ..., ST , AT }.
We assume that the states we observe fully describe the environment, i.e. O(t) = S(t), t where
O(t) is the observation. If the observations are not the same as states, then we are faced with a
partially observed MDP (POMDP) and the observations can be modeled as some function of the
states.
The states are Markovian such that the distribution of future states depends only on the present
states, conditional on all the history. The states evolve according to the transition matrix P , with
elements
P ass′ = Pr{St+1 = s′|St = s,At = a}
Note that the transition depends on both the current state and the action taken.
The agent receives some reward Rt which is a function of states and actions R(St, At). Note that
sometimes Rt is denoted as Rt+1 in some textbooks, but the key is that the reward is instantaneous
following the action taken. We define return Gt as the sum of discounted future rewards with a





Therefore, we define a Markov Decision Process as the tuple of (St, At, P
a
ss′ , Rt, γ).
We care about the optimal control problem, which is a mapping from states to actions. Such
a mapping is a policy function π : S → A. A policy fully defines the behavior of an agent.
MDP policies depend only on the current state, due to the Markovian property. Thus, the policy
has to be stationary. The policy could be deterministic, or it could be stochastic since there are
uncertainties in the reward function. Later we are going to conveniently parameterize the policy
by some function approximators, and denote the policy as πα(a|s) = Pr{At = a|St = s}. Note
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that the parameterized policy is defined as a probability distribution. Sometimes we might abuse
the notation and denote a deterministic policy as a = π(s)
If the analytical solution to the MDP is not available or too difficult to solve, we can make use
of the Bellman Optimality Equation and apply dynamic programming techniques, such as value
iteration and policy iteration. However, to fully back up the future trajectories, we need to know
the transition dynamics. If we don’t, then the reinforcement learning techniques introduced in the
next sections can solve the problem in a possible model-free manner.
2.3.3 Value-based methods
We define the state value function as the maximized sum of discounted future rewards starting
from state s and following policy π:
Vπ(s) = Eπ[Gt|St = s]
Similarly, the state-action value function, which is a more useful way to represent values in the
context of reinforcement learning, is defined by
Qπ(s, a) = Eπ[Gt|St = s,At = a]
Utilizing the Bellman Optimality Equation, the value functions can be written as
Vπ(s) = Eπ[Rt + γVπ(St+1)|St = s]
Qπ(s, a) = Eπ[Rt + γQπ(St+1, At+1)|St = s,At = a]
Under the optimal policy, the maximized value functions are obtained.
V ∗π (s) = maxπ
Vπ(s)
Q∗π(s, a) = maxπ
Qπ(s, a)
If the model transition is known to us, then we can calculate the conditional expectation of
future values using the Bellman Optimality Equation. Otherwise, we resort to sampling, by al-
lowing the agent to interact with the environment and collect episodes of the observed MDP tuple
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(St, At, St+1, Rt). The key to model-free learning is the introduction of the action-value function
Q(s, a). This allows the agent to choose the policy according to Q(s, a), evaluate the policy, and
update Q(s, a).
To calculate the conditional expectation of the future returns Eπ[Gt|St = s], the two most
common techniques are Monte Carlo and Temporal Difference.
2.3.3.1 Monte Carlo and Temporal Difference
The Monte Carlo (MC) returns are the summation of discounted rewards following the ob-
servation of St+1 = s. The expectation of the sample returns is then an unbiased estimate of
Eπ[Gt|St = s]. One subtle problem we might encounter when applying MC learning is that a par-
ticular state may be visited multiple times during an episode. Thus we can either collect returns
after the first visit, or every visit of the state, to calculate the expected returns. The values under
both methods can be shown to converge to the true value asymptotically. We can see that one MC
update requires multiple complete trajectories. To update more frequently hence perhaps learn
faster, another approach to estimate returns is temporal difference learning.
Temporal Difference (TD) learns from incomplete episodes by bootstrapping, and the experi-
ences need not come from the same episodes. Note that bootstrapping in this context is not the
same as bootstrapping as a sampling technique in statistics.
Suppose we have V (St+1), an estimate of the true value function Vπ(St+1), a TD(0) update of
the value function is
V (St)→ V (St) + α(Rt + γV (St+1)− V (St))
where α is the learning rate, Rt+γV (St+1) is called the TD target, and δt = Rt+γV (St+1)−V (St)
is called the TD error.
The update is called TD(0) since we make use of the first reward. Including rewards in n steps
will generalize learning as TD(n). The trade-off is waiting for more steps to update. It’s easy to see
that as n → ∞, TD(∞) is essentially Monte Carlo learning. TD learning exploits the Markovian
property, while MC learning does not since it goes deeper into the late future.
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Comparing TD with MC, we find that TD has the advantage of lower variance, and can update
without fully observing the whole trajectory. This is because MC returns depends on many actions
and transitions, thus the uncertainties accumulate toward the whole trajectory. However, the
TD target is a biased estimator for the true value, whereas the Monte Carlo return is unbiased.
Therefore, we have to make the bias-variance trade-off when choosing between MC and TD rewards.
2.3.3.2 On- and Off-policy learning
In this section, we introduce two value-based algorithms that utilize TD learning, i.e. SARSA
and Q-learning. The two algorithms are quite similar, the difference is that SARSA is on-policy
and Q-learning is off-policy.
If the policy that is being updated is the same as the one that we sample the actions, then
the learning process is called on-policy. On the other hand, if we sample actions from one policy,
and use the generated returns to update another policy, then the learning is called off-policy. We
list Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan (1992)) algorithm below, as in Sutton and Barto (2018). If
we change the value update step from Q(s, a) ← Q(s, a) + α[r + γmaxa′ Q(s′, a′) − Q(s, a)] to
Q(s, a)← Q(s, a) + α[r + γQ(s′, a′)−Q(s, a)], then Q-learning becomes SARSA.
When choosing actions, both algorithms follow an ε greedy policy. In fact, this is a crucial
technique in many model-free learning algorithms. Due to the uncertainties in the reward and state
transition, an agent may encounter ”lucky” state-action pair and keeps exploiting it. However, the
ability to explore other possibilities will prevent the agent from being stuck in a local optima. We
say that an RL agent faces a trade-off of exploration-exploitation. In the context of value-based
learning, this can be simply achieved by deviating from the policy and choosing some random
actions, i.e. ε greedy policy. Both SARSA and Q-learning can be shown to converge asymptotically




for each episode do
Initialize s
for each step in episode do
Choose a with probability 1− ε according to Q(s, a)
Take a, observe s′, r




Both algorithms keep track of Q(s, a) in a table, so they are also called tabular learning methods.
Tabular learning methods are suitable for discrete, finite and limited state-action spaces. It’s
obvious that they will suffer from the curse of dimensionality if we are dealing with a large state
space or continuous state. One approach to address the continuous space problem is to fit the value
function, in particular the state-action value function.
2.3.3.3 Value function approximation
Q-learning and SARSA are tabular methods that are difficult to scale to large state spaces. A
natural extension is to introduce some function to approximate the Q value. Mnih et al. (2013)
proposes Deep Q-learning with experience play (DQN) and achieves human level performance
on game playing with discrete action spaces. We don’t go through the algorithm in details but
emphasize some tricks that boosts training and performance and are also useful in the algorithm
that we use in this study.
As the basic Q-learning, DQN uses TD target as the objective Q in each update step. However,
since the target itself depends on the value derived from the current step, the learning target is
unstable. DQN introduces a target network to output learning target, as opposed to the policy
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network that takes actions, the policy network is synced with the target network only after some
number of training steps.
Another trick of DQN is experience replay, which is saving the previous tuple of state, actions
and rewards, and draw a batch to learn at each step. The purpose is to break the correlation of
data within trajectories.
2.3.4 Policy-based and actor-critic methods
The typical solution to valued-based methods is to choose the action that maximizes the value.
Thus they are more convenient for problems that involve a limited discrete action space. If the
action space is continuous, one solution is to sample actions and calculate their values. But this is
still inefficient due to the nature of the problem. There are some recent studies that address the
issue and strive to solve the continuous action problem with value-based methods. See Gu et al.
(2016) for example. These approaches are somehow tricky and not easy to train. A more natural
solution is to directly parameterize the policy function as some stochastic or deterministic function,
and train the agent to update the parameters.
In particular, a policy function πθ(a|s) maps the state to action, and can be interpreted as the
probability of choosing action a conditional on observing state s. The parameter θ is approximated
by some functions such as neural networks. Parameters are updated using gradient ascend
θ ← θ + α∇θR̄θ
where R̄θ = Eτ∼pθ(τ)[R(τ)] is the expected reward of a trajectory τ = {s0, a0, s1, a1, ..., sT , aT },


























The derivation above implies a convenient update rule that can be easily implemented in modern
auto-differentiation frameworks such as Pytorch or Tensorflow. Note that the expected return of the
trajectory multiplied by the log probability can be treated as some pseudo negative loss function,
so that we can update the policy parameters similar to a supervised learning problem.
It’s convenient to choose the softmax function if the actions are discrete. With continuous
actions, the common choice of the policy distribution is Gaussian. The Gaussian log probability is
easy to calculate. The next question is what to choose as the estimate for the trajectory returns.
A natural choice of R(τ (n)) would be the Monte Carlo episodic rewards. This is the idea of the
REINFORCE algorithm (Williams (1992)).
Algorithm 2 Monte Carlo Policy Gradient (REINFORCE)
Initialize θ in policy πθ(a|s)
for each episode do
for each step in episode do
Choose a according to πθ(a|s), observe reward r
end for
Discount rewards in the trajectory
θ ← θ + α∇θvt log(πθ)
end for
In practice, the rewards could vary a lot among trajectories and cause large variances. To
reduce variances, a common trick is to subtract a baseline that still gives an unbiased estimate
of the rewards. For instance, the baseline could be some estimate of the state value. Note that
the total rewards in the trajectory obtained under the current policy is by definition the Q value
Qπ(s, a). So instead of waiting for the trajectory to finish and collect rewards, we can introduce
another function to approximate the value. The method then becomes so-called Actor Critic, since
we have an ”actor” that is the policy, and a ”critic” that outputs the value to evaluate the policy.
2.3.4.1 Deterministic policy gradient
There are cases when it’s more appealing to have deterministic policies. Silver et al. (2014)
proposes the deterministic policy gradient and shows convergence. Deterministic policy gradient is
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also more sample efficient in theory, since the policy gradient only integrates over the state space
rather than both the state and action space in the stochastic case. A relevant algorithm was later
proposed in Lillicrap et al. (2015), called Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) that also
adopts policy and value networks and several techniques such as DQN.
2.3.4.2 Addressing the value overestimation: TD3
DDPG has been successful in several benchmark tasks to achieve state-of-the-art performance.
Based upon DDPG, Fujimoto et al. (2018) proposes Twin Delayed DDPG (TD3) and further
improves the performance and sample efficiencies in many tasks.
Tuning hyperparameters for DDPG is quite difficult. TD3 addresses two main issues that
may cause DDPG to fail, namely maximization bias and high variance. It’s well understood that
value-based approaches suffer from maximization bias. Since Q-learning always chooses the action
that maximizes the Q value, it tends to exploit the upward errors and causes the expectation to
be overestimated 1. The problem is more severe with function approximation errors. A possible
solution to alleviate the bias is to introduce another Q function for estimation rather than choosing
actions and always construct the TD target with the smaller Q value. This is the idea of Double Q-
learning in Hasselt (2010). Fujimoto et al. (2018) shows that the trick also works in an actor-critic
setting.
To reduce variance and stabilize learning, TD3 also uses target networks for the actor and
critics. Another trick of TD3 to reduce variance and avoid overfitting is target policy smoothing.
Based on the intuition that similar actions should have the similar value, a noise is added into the
target Q function. This helps reduce the variance in updating the critic. TD3 performs quite well
in many continuous tasks so we will choose TD3 to train our trading agent.
1Can be shown with Jensen’s inequality. See Sutton and Barto (2018) 6.7 on why Q values are overestimated.
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Algorithm 3 TD3
Initialize critic networks Qθ1 , Qθ2 , and actor network πφ with random parameters θ1, θ2, φ
Initialize target networks θ′1 ← θ1, θ′2 ← θ2, φ′ ← φ
Initialize replay buffer B
for t = 1 to T do
Select action with exploration noise a ∼ π(s) + ε, ε ∼ N(0, σ) and observe reward r and new
state s′
Store transition tuple (s, a, r, s′) in B
Sample mini-batch of N transitions (s, a, r, s′) from B
← πφ′(s′) + ε, ε ∼ clip(N(0, ),−c, c)
y ← r + γmini=1,2Qθ′i(s
′, )
Update critics θi ← minθi N−1
∑
(y −Qθi(s, a))2
if t mod d then
Update φ by the deterministic policy gradient:
∇φJ(φ) = N−1
∑
∇aQθ1(s, a)|a = πφ(s)∇φπφ(s)
Update target networks:
θ′i ← τθi + (1− τ)θ′i
φ′i ← τφi + (1− τ)φ′i
end if
end for
2.4 The Portfolio Optimization Problem
This section reviews the discrete time intertemporal portfolio optimization problem, following
the notations in Brandt (2010). We study the single asset problem in this paper, and leave the case
of multiple assets in future research.
In the finite horizon, an investor at date t seeks to maximize the utility of the wealth at some







s.t. Ws+1 = Ws[(1 + rf ) + (rs+1 − rf )αs]
where U(·) is some risk adjusted utility, αt’s are the proportions of wealth in the risky asset
varying with time, and rf is the risk-free rate. We assume there are no costs of any form for
now. While it’s easy to include financing cost and commissions, the slippage cost due to market
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impact and bid-ask spreads cannot be obtained via interacting with the environment but has to be
assumed, such as Gârleanu and Pedersen (2013).
The problem could be alternatively formulated as the summation of intermediate consumptions,
such as the case of planning for investment through retirement. Then it becomes Sammuelson and
Merton’s problem (Samuelson (1969), Merton (1969)). However, it can be shown that the policy to
the consumption maximizing problem resembles the one that maximizes the utility of the terminal
wealth (Back (2010)). So we focus on the case of terminal wealth.
If the asset return is predicted by some state variable zt, such that rt+1 = rt(zt), then the state
value function is related to time left τ , current wealth Wt and the state variable zt. Plugging in
the budget constraint and we can write the Bellman equation

















V (τ − 1,Wt[(1 + rf ) + (rt+1 − rf )αt], zt+1)
]
subject to the terminal condition V (0,Wt+τ , zt+τ ) = U(Wt+τ ).
The implied first order condition at each date t
Et
[
V2(τ − 1,Wt[(1 + rf ) + (rt+1 − rf )αt], zt+1) · rt+1
]
= 0
where V2(·, ·, ·) is the partial derivative with respect to the term of wealth.
Assume that the utility is CRRA i.e., U(Wt) =
W 1−γt
1−γ , then the Bellman equation can be written
as
















((1 + rf + (rt+1 − rf )αt)1−γ ]
]
The first term inside the conditional expectation at t is just U(Wt+1), and the second term is
a function of time and the state variable, call it ψ(τ − 1, zt+1). Also normalize Wt = 1 since the
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(1 + rf + (rt+1 − rf )αt)−γψ(τ − 1, zt+1)rt+1
]
= 0
The condition has to be solved numerically under most utility functions and distributional
assumptions. If the risky asset return rt+1 is i.i.d., or independent of the state variable, then
ψ(τ − 1, zt+1) can be factored out of the conditional expectation at t, and solving the dynamic
problem is equivalent to the myopic one. Under normality assumption, the optimal weights can be




In the general case when returns are predictable, the optimal policy will deviate from the myopic
one by the so-called ”hedging demand” (Merton (1969)). An investor deviates from the myopic
policy to hedge against changes of investment opportunities. For the simulation part, we will
investigate both cases when the returns are i.i.d. or predictable.
Remarks on reward shaping
Before moving on to the simulation, it’s necessary to take a deeper look at designing the reward
function, or reward shaping. Finding a good reward signal is more difficult than it seems and
could be crucial for an agent to learn successfully. For the simulation, we intend to explore if the
agent learns the optimal policy for the well-defined problem, i.e. maximizing the expected terminal
utility of wealth. However, if we follow the setup and feed the agent zero reward until the terminal
period, then we suffer from the so-called sparse reward problem. One solution is to do Monte Carlo
discounting. The trade-off is that we can’t update parameters until the whole trajectory of data
is collected. Also, if the trajectory is long, it’s difficult to assign credits to actions that contribute
the most to the rewards. This may be more important when it comes to the real world data, since
the true reward for an action may appear in an uncertain future date.
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To address the reward shaping problem, we follow Ritter (2017) and use a mean variance
approximation as the immediate reward. It’s easy to show that the certainty equivalent a terminal










To decompose the variance, we assume that ∆W ′s are independent,












As such, we define the immediate reward Rt as




where µ̂ is an estimate of E(∆Wt). Unless the Sharpe ratio of the strategy is very high, one has
the approximation
E[(∆Wt − µ̂)2] ≈ E(∆Wt)2
Therefore, we use the approximate function as the immediate reward














Note that we have made several compromises to decompose the terminal reward into immediate
rewards, including the assumption that wealth increments are independent and ignoring the mean
estimate of wealth increments.
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2.5 Simulation results
2.5.1 Binomial returns with Q-learning and Monte Carlo Policy Gradient
In this section, we run Q-learning (Algorithm 1) and Monte Carlo policy gradient (Algorithm
2) on a risky asset with binomial returns, and a risk-free asset. The data generating process and
the learning agents are too simple for practical use, but we aim to understand the basic algorithms
by illustrating their principles, since they are the building blocks of more complicated algorithms.
Assume that the risky asset’s price could double or halve, then the excess return takes rue = 1−rf
or rde = −0.5 − rf , where rf is the risk free rate. Also assume that the investor maximizes log of
the terminal wealth, then it’s easy to show that the optimal policy α∗t is constant and depends only
on the excess returns and the risk-free rate.
α∗t =











βt[log(1 + rf + αtr
u
e ) + log(1 + rf + αtr
d
e)]
We experiment Q learning on both the static and dynamic problem, with discrete action spaces
of different intervals. Q-learning stores the state-action values in a table. The main question of
interest is how large a sample it takes to achieve the analytical values. We are also interested in
how sensitive the model is to hyperparameters.
Monte Carlo policy gradient updates parameters given discounted rewards on whole trajectories.
So we evaluate it only on the dynamic problem.
2.5.1.1 Static model
We start by training the agent to learn a myopic policy online. Note that in a static model with
unpredictable returns, there is no state variable. The state-action value function is just a function
of actions.
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Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the learning curves of Q values and the terminal Q value as a function of
actions. The action step size is chosen at 0.5 and 0.2, respectively. While in some cases convergence
is achieved in 100,000 steps, it takes more than a million steps for the agent to converge when the
step size becomes smaller.
Figure 2.1 Q learning on static model, action space interval 0.5
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Figure 2.2 Q learning on static model, action space interval 0.2
2.5.1.2 Dynamic model
Next we run Q learning and Monte Carlo policy gradient on simulated trajectories of 12 periods
of data. Since our utility is logarithmic, periods left is the only state variable. We record Q values
or policies at 12, 8, 4 and 1 periods left. The discount rate is set at 0.95.
Figure 2.3 and figure 2.4 show the learning curves for Q values and the terminal Q table for
actions and periods left. Not surprisingly, convergence is faster for later periods.
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Figure 2.3 Q learning on dynamic binomial model, action step 0.5
Figure 2.4 Q learning on dynamic binomial model, action step 0.3
Figure 2.5 shows the policy gradient agent’s learning curves on policies of different periods left.
The policies converge faster than Q learning, after several thousand of episodes, and the agent is
able to quickly find out that the policies don’t depend on how many periods are left.
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Figure 2.5 Monte Carlo policy gradient on dynamic binomial model
2.5.2 Normal returns with TD3
In this section, we train the TD3 agent on several scenarios to evaluate the performance. The
network structures of the TD3 agent and hyperparameters chosen are shown in the appendix.
Although more sophisticated network structures such as RNN and CNN perform well in some
tasks, their usage is justified in the context of time series or image data. Since our predictors are
cross-sectional, we choose to use the regular neural networks with ReLU (Rectified Linear Unit)
activations.
We run three experiments with i.i.d. returns: static model with stationary process, static model
with nonstationary process, and multi-period model with a single trajectory. The last experiment
is trading mean reverting spreads. We are mainly interested in whether the optimal policy can be
achieved and in the sample efficiencies.
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2.5.2.1 Static model with stationary process
The first experiment is the static model, in which the agent is trained on the simulated as-
set returns with a stationary data generating process. Current wealth is the only state variable.
There are four parameters in the process, and we change them one at a time to investigate their
convergence properties.
The results are shown in Figure 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9, in which we change mean, variance, risk-
free rate and risk aversion. The red horizontal lines show the analytical values. The actions are all
centered around the theoretical means, although quite noisy. This is because we show the actual
actions taken, which are the learned policy added with white noise. We find that it takes typically
several thousand samples to converge, the worst case scenario takes around 10,000.
Figure 2.6 Static model with changing mean
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Figure 2.7 Static model with changing variance
Figure 2.8 Static model with changing risk-free rate
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Figure 2.9 Static model with changing risk aversion
2.5.2.2 Static model with nonstationary process
Structural changes often exist in the real world data, making the process nonstationary. For
example, the asset returns could be driven by unobserved macroeconomic or political factors, and
the unobserved factors are nonstationary. One practical solution is to use more recent data for
estimation, and roll the data forward to update the model. Here we want to find out if our agent
is capable of adjusting to a changing DGP. Figure 2.10 shows the result of changing the mean
from 0.02 to -0.02 and back to 0.02 every 10000 steps. The agent is able to find the new policy
after thousands of training samples. However, bias could exists and it’s difficult to tell if it’s due
to nonstationarity or the policy itself. Therefore, stationarity needs to be checked before training.
With rolling training, we have to make the trade-off between larger training samples and more
recent stationary data.
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Figure 2.10 Static model with shifting means
2.5.2.3 Training on a single trajectory
So far we have evaluated the agent’s performance based on a new trajectory every episode of
training. In reality, we only observe a single realized trajectory. Thus we care more about what we
can learn from one trajectory.
In the next experiment, we train the agent 1000 times on one trajectory of 100 data points, and
record the ending Sharpe ratio for each training episode. Repeating the experiment 8 times, the
results are shown in figure 2.11. In these experiments, the states are again chosen as the current
wealth, since we seek to solve the infinite horizon problem hence time is not a state any more.
To show a clean graph, we use the rolling means of 30 episodes for the Sharpe ratios. The
Sharpe ratio based on the theoretical policy is depicted by the red horizontal line. It can be seen
that most of the times the agent can learn to achieve a stable and optimal policy on the training
sample, although it could fail to learn anything useful in some cases.
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Figure 2.11 Sharpe ratios of training on a single trajectory
2.5.2.4 Predictable returns
Now we turn to the case of predictable returns. As shown in the previous section, the problem
needs to be solved numerically except for some special cases. We setup the experiment following
the example from Kogan (2010).
Suppose an investor trades some price spread Xt that follows an AR(1) process
Xt+1 = ρXt + εt+1
0 < ρ < 1, ε ∼ N(0, σ2)
Assume zero risk free rate and zero transaction costs, let αt be the position size, and the initial
wealth is W0. Also impose the constraint that wealth cannot be negative. The portfolio value
evolves according to
Wt+1 = Wt + αt(Xt+1 −Xt)
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The investor is subject to a margin constraint, such that when the portfolio value becomes
negative, the trader is locked out from trading. To implement this, for every dollar of the absolute










The state vector includes (t,Wt, Xt), and the action to be taken is the dollar amount in the
risky asset αt. The dynamic programming solution assumes knowing the transitional dynamics and
makes use of the Bellman equation




The details of dynamic programming solution and discretization is listed in the appendix. For
fixed W = 1, we calculate the optimal policies as a function of the price spread for 1, 4, 8, 12
months left. For the TD3 agent, we choose the incremental mean variance objective as in section
2.4. The results are calculated for 50,000 episodes of training. The policy functions are shown in
figure 2.12. The reinforcement learning agent is able to fit the policies as decreasing functions, but
the policies are quite noisy. This is likely due to the errors in the mean variance approximate, and
the policy approximation itself. To what extend the errors could make the model-free policy worse
than the policy under a mis-specified model is worth investigation in the future research.
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Figure 2.12 Optimal policies with different horizon at W = 1 for RL and ADP solutions
2.6 Empirical results
2.6.1 Index trading with predictors
In this section, we train the agent to trade the SP500 index, and one risk-free asset represented
by the 1-month T-bill. The index ETF was only tradable since 1993, but we evaluate with it
regardless for now. The state variables are 14 macroeconomic and 14 technical predictors as in
Neely et al. (2014), the definitions of which can be found in Appendix. We use the same monthly
data, spanning from December 1950 to December 2011. The statistics of the data are listed in
table 2.1. Table 2.2 runs single variate regressions of the excess return on the 28 predictors, and
summarizes their R2s. This is a replication of table 2 in Neely et al. (2014).
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics of predictors, 1950:12 to 2011:12
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Excess return 0.01 0.04 −0.22 0.16
DP 3.49 0.42 2.60 4.52
DY 3.48 0.42 2.59 4.53
EP 2.78 0.44 1.90 4.84
DE 0.71 0.30 −1.38 1.24
RVOL 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.32
BM 0.54 0.25 0.12 1.21
NTIS 0.02 0.02 −0.06 0.05
TBL 4.67 2.95 0.01 16.30
LTY 6.32 2.68 2.21 14.82
LTR 0.56 2.76 −11.24 15.23
TMS 1.64 1.42 −3.65 4.55
DFY 0.96 0.45 0.32 3.38
DFR 0.01 1.38 −9.75 7.37
INFL 0.30 0.35 −1.92 1.79
Note: See appendix for explanations of the predictors.
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Table 2.2 Univariate regression of excess return on predictors, 1950:12 to 2011:12
Macroeconomic variables Technical indicators
Predictor Slope R2(%) Predictor Slope R2(%)
DP 0.78(1.98) 0.58 MA(1,9) 0.67(1.78)** 0.54
DY 0.84(2.13)** 0.67 MA(1,12) 0.87(2.22)** 0.87
EP 0.43(0.97) 0.20 MA(2,9) 0.70(1.88)** 0.59
DE 0.59(0.93) 0.17 MA(2,12) 0.94(2.42)** 1.03
RVOL 7.41(2.45)*** 0.73 MA(3,9) 0.77(2.04)** 0.69
BM 0.54(0.75) 0.10 MA(3,12) 0.54(1.39)* 0.34
NTIS 0.66(0.06) 0.00 MOM(9) 0.55(1.40)* 0.34
TBL 0.11(1.90)** 0.56 MOM(12) 0.58(1.45)* 0.37
LTY 0.08(1.25)** 0.23 VOL(1,9) 0.68(1.86)** 0.56
LTR 0.13(2.05)** 0.76 VOL(1,12) 0.89(2.31)*** 0.92
TMS 0.20(1.74)** 0.44 VOL(2,9) 0.74(2.02)** 0.67
DFY 0.16(0.37) 0.03 VOL(2,12) 0.74(1.94)** 0.65
DFR 0.16(0.89) 0.26 VOL(3,9) 0.48(1.27) 0.27
INFL 0.10(0.18) 0.01 VOL(3,12) 0.85(2.25)*** 0.85
Note: See appendix for explanations of the predictors.
2.6.1.1 Prediction-based portfolio
As a benchmark, we build a prediction-based portfolio with the 28 predictors. The state vari-
ables for the RL agent are also these predictors. We choose linear regression with L1 and L2 regu-
larities, which is also known as elastic net (Zou and Hastie (2005)). Alternative models have been
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experimented, while regularized regression outperforms Principal Component Regression (PCR),
Support Vector Regression (SVR) and Gradient Boosting out-of-sample.
The estimates β̂ is defined by
β̂ = argmin(||y −Xβ||2 + λ2||β||2 + λ1||β||1)
The regularization parameters λ1 and λ2 are chosen through cross validation. Note that it’s
incorrect to do the usual K-fold cross validation with time-series data, since future data points
could be drawn to fit the past model. Following Bergmeir et al. (2018), we first start with a small
subset of data for training, forecast for the later data points and then check the accuracy for the
forecasted data points. The same forecasted data points are then included as part of the next
training dataset. This will prevent the model from using the future data to make predictions about
the past. The procedure is show in figure 2.13.
Figure 2.13 Time series cross validation
Using grid search to find candidate parameters, the best model chosen is λ1 = 0, λ2 = 2.9, which
amounts to just Ridge regression. The out-of-sample mean squared error is 0.00201, as opposed to
0.00302 with unregularized OLS.
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With the predictive model, we predict the mean return next month µ̂, and estimate variance





The first two thirds of the data, ranging from December 1950 to June 1993, are adopted for the
initial training.
2.6.1.2 RL Training results
Again, we adopt the TD3 algorithm to train the RL agent. The hyperparameters are listed in
the appendix. As illustrated in section 4, we use ∆Wt − γ2 (∆Wt)
2 to approximate the immediate
reward for the terminal mean-variance utility. We also assume no transactions costs of any form.
The agent is trained 20,000 times with 511 monthly data points, and the terminal monthly Sharpe
ratios are recorded. The accumulation of wealth obtained by the trained model and the Sharpe
ratios during training are shown in figure 2.14 and figure 2.15. Since training 20,000 episodes takes
about 20 hours on a GTX 1060 GPU, we first train 10,000 episodes, and then another two 5,000
episodes. Each training starts with some warm-up episodes of random actions to collect enough
data, so there are the bumps of the learning curve at 10,000 and 15,000 episodes.
The almost perfect wealth accumulation in figure 2.14 is not surprising, given that reinforcement
learning is prone to overfitting due to its nature. Also, we included all the predictors without feature
selection and dimension reduction. A more careful feature engineering is required before deploying
the model in production. The learning curve suggests that there’s still potential for the agent to
improve by training more episodes.
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Figure 2.14 Wealth accumulation of the trained model
Figure 2.15 Monthly Sharpe ratios during training
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2.6.1.3 Out-of-sample results without retraining
For the testing data from July 1993 to December 2011, we first evaluate the agent without
retraining on a rolling basis. The performance will be benchmarked against a prediction-based
strategy, a static mean-variance portfolio, and a buy-and-hold portfolio of SP500 only.
To make a fair comparison, the benchmark portfolios are not retrained either. The buy-and-
hold-all portfolio simply invests all the initial money to SP500. The static mean-variance portfolio
estimates the mean and variance from the training sample and rebalances every month to form the
mean-variance optimal portfolio, with a risk aversion coefficient of 5. The prediction-based portfolio
fits a regularized linear model with all the predictors in the training sample, predicts the expected
return and form a mean-variance portfolio with the variance estimated from the past returns.
Figure 2.16 shows the wealth accumulation of the agent on the testing data without retraining.
Table 2.3 shows the performance metrics for the four strategies. Even without retraining, the RL
agent beats the other portfolios in all metrics.
Table 2.3 Out-of-sample performance metrics without retraining
RL Buy-hold Mean-variance Prediction
Cummulative return 326.7% 126.3% 108.3% 95.8%
Annual return 8.24% 4.56% 4.08% 3.73%
Annual volatility 17.40% 15.50% 10.81% 26.85%
Sharpe ratio 0.36 0.16 0.13 0.16
Sortino ratio 0.140 0.064 0.053 0.062
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Figure 2.16 Wealth accumulation of test data without retraining
2.6.1.4 Out-of-sample results with retraining
In production, the model should be retrained every month or at least every quarter with updated
data. For our purposes of research and given the limit of computation, we retrain the model every
48 months, each time with 5000 episodes. Accordingly, the benchmark models are also updated
every 48 months.
Figure 2.17 shows the accumulation of wealth for the retrained agent, in which the time points
of retraining is denoted by the red dashed lines. Table 2.4 shows the performance metrics of the RL
portfolio and the prediction-based portfolio. Figure 2.18 shows the drawdowns of the portfolios.
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The RL agent outperforms others in all metrics, achieving 550% cummulative returns in 17 years
and a Sharpe ratio of 0.56. The max drawdown is 32%, which is also less than all other portfolios.
Figure 2.17 Wealth accumulation of test data with retraining every 48 months
Table 2.4 Out-of-sample performance metrics with retraining
RL Prediction
Cummulative return 553.4% 246.7%
Annual return 10.78% 7.02%
Annual volatility 14.50% 16.25%
Sharpe ratio 0.56 0.31
Sortino ratio 0.205 0.117
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Figure 2.18 Underwater plots of the portfolios
2.6.2 Statistical arbitrage
We present a second application of RL by trading the spreads of two assets, namely pairs
trading. Pairs trading profits from betting on the mean reverting behavior of two cointegrated
prices, by shorting the spread when it’s large and longing it when small. The two stocks identified
as cointegrated are Apartment Investment and Management (NYSE:AIV) and National Retail
Properties (NYSE:NNN) between Jan 1, 2019 and Dec 31, 2019. The stock prices are shown in
figure 2.19, which also shows the price spreads as the log price differences, as well as the mean and
one standard deviation interval of spreads.
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The training period lasts from Jan 1, 2019 to Sep 30, 2019. Our RL agent will be trained
with 188 daily data, and tested on the rest 64 days without retraining. Pairs trading relies on the
cointegration of prices. The p-values for the cointegration tests during the training and testing
periods are 0.0216 and 0.0220 respectively.
We first implement the pairs trading strategy. Starting from October 1 2019, the spreads for
the past 120 trading days are calculated, if the spread is larger than 1 standard deviation of the
historical spreads, we long one share of the spread, and vice versa. The position is closed once the
spread falls back within 0.2 standard deviation of the spreads. To keep the portfolio dollar-neutral,
we always long/short the price ratio times PNNN shares of NNN when shorting/longing one share
of AIV, assuming that the shares are traded continuously. Transaction costs, including slippage
and interest rate, are assumed to be zero.
The RL agent observes the spread today, trades the spread between 1 and -1, and get realized
rewards ∆W − γ2V ar(∆Wt). The training algorithm is again TD3, with the hyperparameters in
Appendix. After 5000 episodes of training, positions and the accumulation of wealth are shown in
figure 2.20, together with those of the pairs trading. Table 2.5 shows the performance metrics. The
RL agent starts to outperform the pairs trading strategy in the later half of the testing period, and
wins in the end in terms of terminal wealth and risk adjusted returns. Interestingly, both the pairs
trading strategy and RL agent agree on shorting the spread in the later half of the testing period,
given that the spreads are indeed much higher than the mean.
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Figure 2.19 Prices and spreads of AIV and NNN, 1/1/2019 to 12/31/2019
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Figure 2.20 Results for RL and pairs trading
Table 2.5 Performance metrics for RL and pairs trading
RL Pairs Trading
Terminal wealth 2.43 1.42
Sharpe ratio 0.24 0.19
Sortino ratio 0.79 0.75
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2.7 Conclusion and discussion
This paper studies reinforcement learning on the portfolio optimization problem. We apply
basic value and policy based algorithms on well defined problems and evaluate their convergence
and sample efficiencies. We also apply state-of-the-art approaches to trading the stock index and
price spreads, and show that they outperform prediction-based methods. While the results are
promising, there are still some potential issues we realize and are worth more research in the
future.
Transaction cost Our experiments do not consider any transaction costs, including commis-
sions and slippage costs. It’s not difficult to include commissions and taxes, and RL rewards can be
adjusted to accommodate them. For other costs, assumptions have to be made such as quadratic
transaction costs as in Gârleanu and Pedersen (2013). Returns are anticipated to be lowered once
transaction costs are included. In theory the agent should learn to trade less frequently due to the
penalty of costs.
Multiple assets and approximation error The case of multiple assets is more common
in practice. We have done some experimental research on multiple assets with simulation, and
the policies are not quite stable, this is likely due to the noise of the policies. Our results on the
single assets have been noisy as well. The errors may be a more severe problem for multiple asset
since the objective is quite sensitive to asset weights. The main sources of errors include the policy
approximator itself, and the appproximation of the incremental mean variance reward. The second
source may be less difficult to address. As discussed in section 4, we assume independent wealth
increments and ignore the mean estimate of wealth increments, in order to decompose the terminal
reward into immediate rewards. A possible remedy could be keeping track of the average rewards
instead of the incremental rewards, as suggested by Kolm and Ritter (2019).
Dimension reduction and feature engineering While computational costs may not be
a concern with more powerful hardware in production, it’s still worthwhile to reduce the state
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space for faster experimental iterations. There are many possible techniques from the literature
of unsupervised learning, such as PCA and t-SNE. Alternatively, feature selection methods from
supervised learning models such as regularized regression and decision trees could also help us
identify more relevant features for our RL agent. In fact, feature engineering needs to be undertaken
prior to training RL models, although finding the optimal policy is our ultimate goal. This also
allows us to keep track of the performance of RL and prediction-based portfolios. After all, the
information as model input is much more crucial to the model itself.
Improving RL efficiency with model-based methods Model free algorithms are flexible
and do not need any domain knowledge, while the trade off is the sample efficiency. Financial data
is in its nature quite noisy, and predicting mean returns is still extremely difficult, if not impossible.
But it’s still possible to incorporate our domain knowledge to aid learning, as in the model-based
approaches. Models about the state transition can be used directly to predict future states, or
generate sample trajectories for learning. This has the potential to improve sample efficiencies
substantially. The more difficult problem then becomes how to model the environment. In this
sense, RL can be improved with a proper transition model.
Our research has shown promising results of RL on portfolio optimization. Thanks to the
increasing computational power and active research community, RL is bound to be make more
progress in the area of computational finance. RL has shown to be quite successful in many
areas. However, we can’t ignore the fact that theory is lagged behind practice. There hasn’t been
much breakthrough in theory for years. Most achievements of the modern RL are attributed to
practical tricks built upon existing methodological frameworks, as well as the computational power
that boosts neural networks as function approximators. For RL models to be widely accepted for
investment, it will be more convincing once the theory makes progress to explain why RL works so
well.
Our future work will focus on building a more realistic system by incorporating various trans-
action costs, and address the case of multiple risky assets. To make better use of limited data and
incorporate domain knowledge, we will also work on model-based approaches.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Network structure of the TD3 agent and hyperparameters
TD3 Critic













target update rate: 0.005; policy noise: 0.2 * max action
optimizer: Adam; learning rate: 1e-3
policy frequency: 2; exploration noise: 0.1;
batch size: 256; noise clip: 0.5 * max action
2.8.2 Approximate dynamic programming on predictable returns
Following Kogan (2010), we discretize the (X,W ) space into two dimensional grids as
ˆX(1), ˆX(2), ... ˆX(NX)
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ˆW (1), ˆW (2), ... ˆW (NW )







Denote the corresponding CDF as F (Xt+1|Xt) and spacing of the X grid as ∆X , the unnormal-




f(X̂(i′)|X̂(i))∆X i′ = 2, ..., NX − 1
F (X̂(1) + ∆X/2|X̂(i)) i′ = 1
1− F (X̂(NX) + ∆X/2|X̂(i)) i′ = NX




Now that the transition probabilities for X̂ are defined, we can find the probabilities for Ŵ
given α
W̃ = Ŵ (j) + α(i′ − i)∆X
But this probability may not fall on the W grid, so for a transition to W̃ that is not on the
grid, the transition is randomly set to Ŵ (k) or Ŵ (k + 1) such that Ŵ (k) < W̃ < Ŵ (k + 1). The
transition probability to Ŵ (k + 1) is set to p(i, i′)λ, with λŴ (k + 1) + (1− λ)Ŵ (k) = W̃ and
λ =
W̃ − Ŵ (k)
Ŵ (k + 1)− Ŵ (k)
When W falls outside of the range, it’s replace with Ŵ (NW ). If W < 0, the value function is
set at the utility of wealth due to the constraint.
Also discretizing αt as α̂(1), ..., α̂(Nα), then the values can be calculated using the transitional
probabilities and Bellman equation




Ĵ(t+ 1, Ŵt+1, X̂t+1)
]
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The parameters for the approximate dynamic programming and RL methods are
Risk aversion: 5; rho: e^(-0.5dt);
sigma: 0.1sqrt(dt); dt=1/12; T=1
2.8.3 Predictors for the SP500 index
We followed Neely et al. (2014) and used the same data and variables. The data comes from
updated monthly data of Welch and Goyal (2008). The equity risk premium is the difference
between the continuously compounded return on the S&P 500 (including dividends) and the log
return on a risk-free bill. The following 14 macroeconomic variables are representative of the
literature Welch and Goyal (2008) and constitute the set of xit variables used to predict the equity
risk premium.
1 Dividend-Price Ratio (DP). Campbell and Shiller (1988) have shown the dividend-price ratio
can be used to forecast future market returns. If the current dividend-price ratio is high,
future returns are also likely to be high. We use the log of a 12-month moving sum of
dividends paid on the S&P 500 Index minus the log of S&P 500 prices.
2 Dividend yield, (DY): log of a 12-month moving sum of dividends minus the log of lagged
stock prices.
3 Earnings-price ratio (EP) Graham et al. (1934) used EP as an indicator of value. Campbell
and Shiller (1988) reported that the EP ratio explains as much as 40% of future returns. A
high Earnings-price ratio today indicates a high equity premium. We use the price divided
by earnings over the last 12 months.















5 Book-to-market ratio(BM). Pontiff and Schall (1998) used the book-to-market ratio of the
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) to predict market returns. A high current book-to-
market ratio indicates high future market returns. We use book-to-market value ratio for the
Dow Jones Industrial Average.
6 Net equity expansion(NTIS).This is the ratio of a 12-month moving sum of net equity issues
by NYSE-listed stocks to the total end-of-year market capitalization of NYSE stocks.
7 Treasury bill rate(TBL). It is the interest rate on a three-month Treasury bill.
8 Long-term yield(LTY). It is the long-term government bond yield.
9 Long-term return(LTR): It is the return on long-term government bonds.
10 Term spread(TMS) which is the long-term yield minus the Treasury bill rate.
11 Term Spread (TERM). Fama and French (1989) also put forward using the difference between
the yield on Aaa bond portfolio and the one-month Treasury bill rate as a variable to track
the business cycle. They found TERM tracks time-varying stock returns. If TERM is high
today, future discount rates are high and the equity premium is also high. We use the yield
difference between the 10-year Treasury note and the three-month Treasury bill.
12 Default Yield Spread (DFY). Fama and French (1989) proposed using the difference between
the Baa and Aaa corporate bond yields as a measure of short-term business conditions. DFY
is related to discount rates effects at the business cycle frequency. If DFY is high, expected
returns are also high. We use the difference between Baa yield and Aaa yield.
13 Default return spread(DFR) which is the long-term corporate bond return minus the long-
term government bond return.
14 Inflation(INFL): calculated from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban consumers.
We use xi,t−1 for inflation to account for the delay in CPI releases.
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Other than macroeconomic variables, Neely et al. (2014) also stated the importance of technical
indicators. They employed 14 technical indicators based on three popular technical strategies. The
first one is a moving-average(MA) rule that generates a buy or sell signal at the end of t by
comparing two moving average:
Si,t =

1 if MAs,t ≥MAl,t








Pt−i ∀j = s, l (2.4)
Pt is the level of a stock price index and s(l) is the length of the short (long) MA (s < l). We denote
the MA indicator with MA lengths s and l by MA(s, l). Intuitively, the MA rule detects changes in
stock price trends, because the short MA will be more sensitive to recent price movement than the
long MA. For example, when prices have recently been falling, the short MA will tend to be lower
than the long MA. If prices begin trending upward, then the short MA tends to increase faster than
the long MA, eventually exceeding the long MA and generating a buy signal. We analyze monthly
MA rules with s = 1, 2, 3 and l = 9, 12.
The second one is momentum and the rule is generated based on:
Si,t =

1 if Pt ≥ Pt−m
0 if Pt < Pt−m
(2.5)
Intuitively, a current stock price that is higher than its level m periods ago indicates “positive”
momentum and relatively high expected excess returns, thereby generating a buy signal. We denote
the momentum indicator that compares Pt to Pt−m by MM(m) where m = 9, 12.






where V OLk is the measure of the trading volume during period k and Dk is binary variable that
takes a value of one if Pk − Pk−1 ≥ 0 and −1 otherwise. The the trading signal is as below:
Si,t =

1 if MAOBVs,t ≥MAOBVl,t










OBVt−i ∀j = s, l (2.8)
Intuitively, relatively high recent volume together with recent price increases indicate a strong
positive market trend and generate a buy signal. We compute monthly signals for s = 1, 2, 3 and
l = 9, 12 and denote the corresponding indicator by V OL(s, l).
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CHAPTER 3. AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF AN ALTERNATING
BARGAINING GAME WITH UNCERTAINTIES
Shirui Wang, Kuaishou Technology
Modified from a manuscript to be submitted to Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Abstract
I propose an alternating offer game with tractable uncertainties as the probability of the bar-
gaining power shift. Proposers speculate on the types of responders being strategic or fair. The
offers and the uncertainties exhibit an inverted U-shape curve, while the demands of responders
increase on average. The experimental results show that the marginal effect of uncertainties
on the responder demand is twice as large as the proposer offer. When the bargaining power
increases, responders also tend to return less as a revenge. The fair split remains the mode re-
gardless of uncertainties, suggesting a very high belief of fair players. With the strategy method
design, simulation also shows that the fair offer is indeed the optimal strategy for proposers,
whereas responders are better off by asking for a larger share. The dominance of fair split is
thus justified by the model, experiment and simulation.
3.1 Introduction
There has been extensive literature on the ultimatum game (UG) since the lab experiment was
first implemented by Güth et al. (1982). UG can be regarded as a simplified representation of the
bargaining process, and has implications on various economic topics involving worker motivation,
contracts and the notion of a fair price (Webster and Sell (2014)). The fair split is robust among
almost all experimental settings, despite economists’ attempts to find the conditions such that
participants would agree on unfair deals. Among others, fairness is one of the most crucial social
factors that are missing in the conventional utility functions. Realizing that the opponent cares
about fairness, the fair offer may be due in large part to the fear of rejection, which contrasts with
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the predicted first-mover advantage in theory. Thus the responder indeed possesses the bargaining
power, and the proposer might raise the offer as the opponent’s bargaining power increases. To
represent the bargaining power in a more tractable way, it’s convenient to extend the one-shot game
to multiple stages.
The alternating bargaining game was first introduced in theory by Stahl (1972) for the finite-
horizon and Rubinstein (1982) for the infinite-horizon. Most bargaining cases in the real world
consist of multiple stages. Again, the lab experiments do not support the theoretical predictions,
even if there are only two stages. Most experiments follow the Stahl-Rubinstein model by shrink-
ing the total size of the pie, to imitate the fact that people are less patient with future payoffs.
Nevertheless, discounting is not always the case in bargaining. For instance, sometimes people are
willing to wait for a better deal. The bargaining power and how the information is revealed is the
key determinant to the outcome. Therefore, it’s more appropriate to model the speculation on the
opponent’s bargaining power as a stochastic problem. I propose a game with the stochastic shift
of bargaining power being known to both players. The game is modeled in two stages. Studies
suggest that participants barely utilize backward induction, let alone too many stages (Camerer
(2003)). It’s sufficient to approximate the infinite horizon problem with two stages.
To incorporate the social factor into the theoretical model, we assume two types of responders
and that the uninformed proposers speculate based on their beliefs. The responders could care about
being fairly treated or not, and the proposers are all strategic players. One notable implication
of the simple model is that the mean offer increases inelastically with the risk, but falls as the
risk becomes too high. The responders, on the other hand, demand more on average as the risk
increases. The game is implemented with online participants and the results are consistent with
the model. Nevertheless, the proportion of fair splits is much higher than the one implied by the
model, which assumes that the beliefs of responder types follow the uniform distribution. This
suggests a left skewed distribution of the beliefs on fair types, which means that the majority of
people believe in a higher proportion of fair players. The data also allow us to run simulations
and find out the optimal strategies that bring the highest expected payoffs. It turns out that the
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fair offer is indeed optimal for proposers, which is made by the majority. Responders, on the other
hand, are better off as they increase the demand with a larger bargaining power.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 introduces the
game structure and the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the experimental design. Section
5 shows the graphical and regression results. Section 6 illustrates the optimal strategy through
simulation. The paper concludes in section 7.
3.2 Literature review
As probably the most replicated lab experiment, the stylized facts that 40% ∼ 50% is offered
in the ultimatum game and around 30% in the dictator game have inspired several explanations in
the literature. By only keeping people who understand the game as a result of quizzes, Kahneman
et al. (1986) show that it’s not that participants are confused Hoffman et al. (1995) show that it
doesn’t matter whether the stake is $1 or $100. Hoffman et al. (1994) show that proposers exhibit
less altruism when the right to propose is earned or the environment is anonymous. Forsythe et al.
(1994) illustrate that the fear of rejection and deliberately being fair are both the incentives for the
fair offers.
There are theoretical models that attempt to incorporate factors such as fairness and altruism
into the utility maximizing framework. Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000), are among such type of models. These model typically assume the same utility
function irrelevant of the role in the bargaining, which is questionable since it depends on the
role—getting a half is different for proposers and responders. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose a
linear model in which the proposers are punished by unequal offers. They either get ”advantage
disutility” with more than a half, or ”disadvantage disutility” if less, the ”disadvantage disutility”
is assumed to be more dominant. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) construct a non-linear model and
also build on the idea that people dislike unequal payoffs. The model seeks to explain games where
equity, reciprocity and competition are non-negligible factors. These two models are tested in
Kagel and Wolfe (2001) using a three person bargaining game. However, the experimental results
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are contrary to the predictions in the models. Cox et al. (2007) construct a parametric model and
estimate the parameters with existing datasets. To the extent that these models rely on parametric
assumptions for empirical validation, it’s still an open question how they can be constructed for
useful predictions.
We refer to Güth and Kocher (2014) for a thorough review of more than thirty years of ex-
periments of ultimatum games, and present some empirical findings here. Personal characteristics
affect equilibrium offers. Older people tend to make fair offers and reject unfair offers (Roalf et al.
(2011)). There is gender difference that is not due to risk preferences (Garćıa-Gallego et al. (2012)).
Time also influences offers. Time pressure leads to an increase in offers Cappelletti et al. (2011),
whereas cooling-off period makes it less likely to reject unfair offers Grimm and Mengel (2011).
Since the introduction of alternating offer games, there have been many lab experiments, despite
Rubinstein (1982) argues against using the model for empirical predictions. Like in the one-shot
ultimatum games, the predictions are hardly observed empirically, even for two-round games (Roth
(1995), Camerer (2003)). The first such experiment was implemented by Binmore et al. (1985).
The mode of offers is still 50-50, although a proposer is more likely to propose the strategic offer
after he/she played the game once as a responder.
3.3 Model
In this section we illustrate the game structure, and discuss the models with the agents being
homogeneous or not.
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Figure 3.1 The extensive form of the bargaining game
Figure 3.1 shows the extensive form of the game. In each round, the game consists of two stages.
The proposer moves first and proposes a split (1 − x, x), where x is continuous and bounded in
[0, 1]. If the responder accepts, the deal is done. If the responder rejects, she gets to play a lottery
with the odds of π ∈ [0, 1]. Upon winning, she becomes the dictator and proposes a final split
(y, 1 − y) without the original proposer’s agreement. Note that the lottery is played only if the
responder rejects the offer in the first stage. The rule is publicly announced before the game starts,
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and the odds of the lottery π varies from round to round. In this setting, the standard ultimatum
game could be viewed as this two-stage game with π = 0.
3.3.1 Homogeneous players
With homogeneous players and the standard assumptions including risk neutrality, the Sub-
game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) is easy to solve using backward induction. Contingent
on rejecting the offer and winning the lottery, the responder will keep the whole pie and propose
y = 0 to the proposer. Therefore, the responder’s expected payoff from rejecting the offer is π. In
stage one, she will accept any offer x > π, and reject any x < π. x = π is the offer at which the
responder is indifferent, namely her minimum acceptable offer (MAO). Knowing this, the proposer
will propose (1− π, π), and the agreement is made in the first stage. This is the unique SPNE. As
π varies, the offer and MAO should vary accordingly.
(SPNE for homogeneous players)
The SPNE for homogeneous players is that the proposer proposes (1−π, π), the responder accepts
the offer as π is her minimum acceptable offer, and the game ends in the first stage.
3.3.2 Heterogeneous players
Homogeneous and risk neutral agents obviously could not explain the experimental results.
Here we assume two types of responders and one type of proposers. Under these assumptions, the
sequential game is a screening game that the uninformed player moves first.
Assumption 1. There are two types of responders: Strategic and Fair. The Strategic have
MAO = π. The Fair only accept offers of at least one half and are indifferent with any higher
offers. Both types return zero upon rejection and winning the lottery.
Assumption 2. The proposers are homogeneous and risk neutral. In each round, they have only
two possible offers: the strategic offer π and the fair offer 1/2. They believe that the return offer is
zero if the responder rejects and wins the lottery.
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Assumption 3. Each proposer has a subjective belief about the fraction of people λF being of the
Fair type. λF ∼ Uniform(0, 1).
Figure 3.2 The extensive form of the bargaining game with heterogeneous players
Figure 3.3 The simplified extensive form of the bargaining game with heterogeneous play-
ers
The extensive form is depicted in Figure 3.2. Under the assumptions, the game is essentially
a screening game in which the uninformed player, proposer, moves first. The Fair type responder
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is assumed to only care about being fairly treated, i.e. she gets ”disadvantage disutility” but no
”advantage disutility”, as in the terminology of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We can further simplify
the extensive form by calculating the expected payoffs, as depicted in 3.3. From the proposer’s
perspective, the expected payoffs from playing the strategic offer π is
US = (1− λF )(1− π) + λF 1π> 1
2
· (1− π) (3.1)
By making the strategic offer, the proposer expects to get 1− π from the strategic responders
regardless of π, but get 1 − π from the fair type only when π > 1/2 since unfair offers will be
rejected.
The expected payoffs from playing the fair offer 1/2 is








By making the fair offer, the proposer expects to share the pie evenly with the fair type in any
round, but get 1/2 from the strategic type only when π ≤ 1/2.
Therefore, we have the following proposition on the equilibrium depending on the proposers’
subjective beliefs.
Proposition 1. Nash Equilibrium
When 12 < π ≤ 1, the proposer chooses the strategic offer when she believes that 0 ≤ λF < 2− 2π,
and the offer is accepted. When π ≤ 1/2, the proposer chooses the strategic offer when she believes
that λF <
1/2−π
1−π , and the offer is accepted.
By Assumption 3, we can further calculate the mean offers among uniform λF depending on π.
Proposition 2. Mean offer
When 12 < π ≤ 1, the mean offer is −2π
2+3π−0.5. When π ≤ 1/2, the mean offer is −π2+0.5π+0.251−π .
The relationship between π and the mean offer is depicted in Figure 3.4. It’s clear that all offers
are shifted towards the fair offer. The offer increases and reaches the peak at π = 0.75, but then
falls. This seems counterintuitive, but as π increases, the proposer who plays the strategic offer
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has to be very convinced that the majority of people are strategic. Thus, the mean offer is likely
to decrease when π gets too large, given our assumption of the uniform λF .
Figure 3.4 Odds of lottery and mean offer
Finally, we can also find the mean minimum acceptable offer (MAO) for the responders, and
it’s clear that the mean MAO increases with π.
Proposition 3. Mean MAO
Given the true λ∗F , the mean MAO is 0.5λ
∗
F + π − πλ∗F , and is increasing with π.
3.4 Experiment Design
The interactive online game was designed based on the framework of oTree (Chen et al. (2016)).
The experiment was then conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). The online games pro-
vides a better anonymous environment than the labs, which can reduce the noise caused by imperfect
double-blind designs. Amir et al. (2012) shows that the results on AMT are comparable to those
in the lab using the strategy method. According to the demographics collected by Paolacci et al.
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(2010), the average age and income level is about the national average for U.S. workers. Workers
on AMT are compensated at a relatively low hourly rate. We pay them at a higher rate and expect
the data quality to be better.
We utilize two designs, the strategy method and the direct-response method. Players in the
strategy method groups are asked to provide the whole strategy space. Since participants play
multiple rounds, and the realization of the lottery could influence the participants’ subsequent
decisions, the game is designed such that players proceed independently without knowing the
updated result or payment in each round. In particular, the responders indicate their minimum
acceptable offers (MAOs) and the return offers to the opponent if they reject and win the lottery,
without seeing the actual offer. In fact, the responders in the strategy method group never see
the actual offers until the whole game is completed. On the other hand, responders in the direct-
response group decide whether they want to accept the offer that is shown to them, and choose
their return offers. In both settings, the proposers are given exactly the same questions.
Proposers in the strategy method are told that the opponents are making decisions so they have
to ”wait for response”, although the payments are calculated after all players’ data are collected
and matched. They are forced to stay for a random time period that is drawn from the distribution
of the actual responding time.
The direct-response method is the more straightforward way in bargaining games, whereas the
strategy method has the advantage that it enables us to get the responders’ strategies without
being affected by the opponent’s heterogeneity. Also, we can use the complete strategy space of
both types of players to simulate the payoffs. The two methods have their own pros and cons (see
Brandts and Charness (2011) for a survey), we collect data using both methods and compare the
results.
Players are assigned randomly into the one of the two roles that is fixed in all rounds. In each
round, players are matched with anonymous new players. Since we have to wait for all players’
arrival for shuffling and matching in the direct-response methods, which may result in unexpected
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long waiting time and dropouts, the game is run in small batches of 5 pairs. Players in the strategy
method proceed the game in a survey-like fashion.
Proposers play the first round dictator game and also reveal their MAO if being the responder.
By doing this, we obtain their ”least guilty” offer as a proxy for their own thresholds, which
could also be related to the speculated return offer if being rejected. The second round proceeds
as the standard ultimatum game. We start to introduce the lottery from the third round, in
which the odds of lottery is 50%. The chance of the lottery changes to 30%, 90%, 10%, 70%, and
100%. The probabilities are reordered to mitigate the concern that participants are induced to vary
their behavior in response to increasing or decreasing probabilities. We also limit the number of
probabilities in case the quality of responses deteriorates after too many rounds of similar questions.
All players are forced to stay for at least several seconds in the instructing and decision making
pages, which is gradually reduced by round to accommodate learning.
The stake in each round is $1. Players make choices of cents, on a scale of 0 to 100, with a step
of 5. The payoffs and final results are presented once all rounds are completed. The third round
serves as a practice round without payments, in which the concept of the two-stage game is first
introduced. After the game ends, players complete the survey for their demographic characteristics
and subjective attitudes towards fairness and risk. Altruism, albeit crucial for both roles, is not





Summary statistics of all participants’ demographic characteristics are shown in Table 3.1. We
recruited 101 pairs of participants, of which 51 pairs are in the strategy method group and 50
in the direct-response group. On a scale of 1 to 5, the ”Hates unfair” variable is the answer to
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the question ”comparing with other people, how much do you hate being unfairly treated?”. The
variable ”likes risk” is the self-reported attitude towards risk loving, on a scale of 1 to 5. We also
use the gamble table as in Eckel and Grossman (2002) to elicit the risk attitude as a numerical
measure. Players are asked to choose one of five options of gambles. The measure ranges from 0 to
16.97, a higher value of which indicates being more risk loving. The demographics are comparable
with previous studies on AMT (Paolacci et al. (2010)). In general, people are risk averse and do
not like unfairness.
The summary statistics of all proposers’ offers are shown in Table 3.2. Since the proposers in
the two groups are presented with the same questions, we expect that the offers in the two groups
come from the same distribution. This is confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on offers in
all rounds. Thus we combine the data for proposers in both groups in the later analysis. The means
of dictator and ultimatum offers are in line with previous studies conducted on AMT (Amir et al.
(2012)). After making the dictator offer, proposers are asked to reveal their MAOs if they were the
responder. The t-test shows that the difference between the two variables is indistinguishable from
zero, which means that the proposers use their own thresholds as the conjecture. In the regression
analysis, this variable will serve as a control for the proposers’ incentives of fairness and altruism.
The offer in the a 10% chance lottery case is somewhat lower than the one in the standard
ultimatum game, which may be regarded as a generalized two-stage game with a 0% chance lottery.
However, since the game structures are different, we don’t expect the players to view the game in
this way. It could be explored in the future whether a tiny chance of shifting the bargaining power
will result in the same offer as in the one-stage game. The mean offer increases as the probability
rises, until it drops to the fair offer after 90%.
Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics for responders of the strategy method group. The
10% chance lottery MAO is also lower than the ultimatum MAO. MAO keeps increasing with the
probability. MAO surpasses 50 as the lottery reaches 70%. Responsers demand 67.94 cents on
average, when she will surely gain the whole bargaining power upon rejection. The responder offer
goes up and reaches the peak at 50% lottery and then drops. Notice that the dictator offers upon
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rejection and winning are substantially lower than the one-stage dictator offers, with zero being
the modes, indicating that they are either punishing unsatisfactory offers or tend to behave like
the theory predicts as responders. The figures for responder offers in the strategy method group
will be shown in the next section.
Inspite of the efforts to make players understand and get involved in the experiment, it’s almost
impossible to avoid unengaged players. There are players who constantly make offers or MAOs
to be 0 or 100. All the data are kept for analysis, since some of our non-parametric analysis are
immune to outliers.
3.5.1.2 Graphical analysis
With proposers in both groups and responders in the direct-response group, Figure 3.5 depicts
the distributions in the standard ultimatum and dictator games. The means are represented by
the verticle red lines. The distributions of proposer offers in the two-stage game are shown in
Figure 3.6. All distributions have the mode of 50, although we can find the shift of weights as the
bargaining power changes. What’s striking is that when the responder will certainly become the
dictator upon rejection, 66% of the offers are 50, which is even higher than that in the round of
50% lottery.
For responders in the strategy method group, distributions of MAOs and return offers upon
rejection are shown in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8. The modes for MAO are again almost all 50,
except for the 10% lottery case. The weight of the distributions shift to the right, with 24%
responders demanding 100 when the bargaining power reaches the largest. Most return offers are
zero when the lottery is won, which is far from the one-stage dictator offers.
Graphically, it seems that the offers and MAOs follow different distributions. To confirm this,
we run pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the same distributions. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 show
the p-values of the test. For offers and MAOs, the distributions at the two extremes are obviously
not the same. When the probabilities are close, most of the distributions are indistinguishable.
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Figure 3.9 is the scatterplot of the proposer offers, responder MAOs and return offers with the
probability of the lottery. Only return offers in the strategy method group are plotted. Connecting
the means, the proposer offer shows an increasing and concave trend, while the responder MAO
shows an increasing and convex trend. The mean of return offers first increases and then decreases
after 50% of lottery.
Figure 3.10 shows the rejection rates in the direct-response group. Small offers are almost
always rejected in the 90% and 100% cases. Overall, around 25% offers for 10% to 70% cases are
rejected. The rejection rate becomes 52% and 44% when the chance of winning reaches 90% and
100%. This implies that risk-averse responders are more confident on gaining the bargaining power
when the probability passes the threshold between 70% to 90%. It seems that the proposers are
not that responsive and this creates the failure of agreements on the first stage.
Figure 3.11 shows the return offers in the direct-response group. Notice that these offers are
made by those who already choose to reject the unsatisfactory offers, thus we find more 0s and less
50s, since the punishing is likely to be related to MAOs.
We also calculate the rejection rates based on MAOs for the strategy method group, as shown
in Figure 3.12. Comparing with those in the direct-response group, the rejection rates are higher.
This is consistent with the empirical studies that responders typically make higher demands using
the strategy method (Brandts and Charness (2011)).
3.5.2 Regression results
Table 3.6 shows the regression results of all proposer offers on the probability of lottery and
other control variables. Column 1 and 2 include the standard ultimatum game as a two-stage game
with 0% probability, whereas column 3 and 4 do not. Column 1 and 3 add the squared probabilities
to capture nonlinearities. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
The units for probabilities and offers are percentage points and cents, respectively. To interpret
the results in the linear specification in column 3, which only includes the two-stage game design,
the marginal effect on the proposer offer of a 10% increase in the probabiliy is 1.48 cents. Column 4
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includes the squared probability, the term is significant and negative, indicating that the marginal
effect is positive and concave.
We also include the proposer’s minimum acceptable offer as a control for the own threshold,
but the effects are small and insignificant. The other individual control variables do not seem to
be significant regressors individually, although an F-test shows that they are jointly significant.
Table 3.7 shows the regression results for responders’ MAOs and return offers. Responders
demand at least 3.07 cents or 3.59 cents as the chance of becoming a dictator increase by 10%, with
or without the standard ultimatum game as a 0% lottery game. When the probability squared is
included, the marginal effect is positive and convex. This shows that responders are much more
responsive to the shift of the bargaining power, the marginal effect on MAO is almost twice as
much as that on the offer. The only individual control variable that is significant is age. Older
people tend to demand more as the bargaining power increases. The individual control variables
are jointly significant.
For the responder offer, the marginal effect is polinomial, the peak of which is about 55%.
This implies that the return offer first slightly increases before 55%, and drops when the bargaining
power grows, possibly due to punishing. If the responder hates being unfairly treated, or is more risk
loving, she tends to return less when gaining the power. These results on the personal characteristics
seem to be intuitive, although they are less influential when it comes to the first-stage behaviors.
With the players in the direct-response method group, Table 3.8 shows the regression on the
probability to reject. The result is consistent with that in the strategy method. Coefficients on
individual charactersitics show somehow different results. The self reported variable that indicates
how the person hates to be unfairly treated has a positive coefficent on the probability to reject.
Risk lovers are also more likely to reject.
3.6 Simulation
The strategy method allows us to run simulations on the expected payoffs for the strategies of
both agents. Since players are matched with new players in each round, participants maximize the
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total payoffs by maximizing the payoff in each round. Proposers in both groups are combined, only
responders’ data in the strategy method are adopted for simulation.
For a proposer’s offer in a particular round, we first draw a random sample with replacement
from the repsonder MAOs in the same round, and calculate the proportion that the offer is accepted
as the expected accepting probability. Assuming that the responder expects to get zero if the offer
is rejected, her expected payoff is thus the probability times the amount that she keeps. Repeat
the process for 10,000 times, we get the distribution of the mean payoffs, the mean of which is
the expected payoff for the strategy. In such a way, we get the bootstrapped payoffs depending on
strategies.
Figure 3.13 depicts the expected payoffs for proposer offers. It’s obvious that the expected
payoffs are lower as the bargaining power shifts to the responder. Offering 50 is always the best
strategy until the odds of the lottery reach 70%. After that, offering 60 in the 90% scenario and
55 in the 100% gives the highest payoff. This is also consistent with our prediction of the theory
based on heterogeneous players. The horizontal red lines show the upper quartile of payoffs. Thus
most proposers are indeed playing the optimal strategy by proposing the fair split.
Assuming that the responder’s expected payoff after rejection is $1 times the probability of the
lottery, we can also calculate the bootstrapped payoffs for responders’ strategies. The results are
shown in Figure 3.14. The payoff functions indicate that the responder should demand more as the
odds of lottery increase, although 50 still seems to a safe strategy.
One caveat with the simulation, especially on the responders’ strategies, is due to how players
perceive the expected payoffs upon rejection. The experiment shows that the rejection rate almost
doubles when the probability changes from 70% to 90%. It’s not surprising since most people are
risk-averse. This implies that the expected payoff of $1 times the probability may not be the best
representation. In fact, the dramatic shift of the payoffs is mostly driven by this. However, the
perception of the lottery could also be heterogeneous among players.
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3.7 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper models an alternating bargaining game as a screening game in which the uninformed
proposer speculates on the types of the responder. To represent the uncertainties and study how
players react, we vary the probability of bargaining power shift. The experimental results show
that proposers tend to offer more, and responders demand more and return less, as the bargaining
power shifts to the responders. Responders are more responsive to the change. Comparing the
two experimental design of strategy method and direct response, lower shares are more likely to
be accepted once observed by the responder. The marginal effects are nonlinear for both proposer
offers and responder MAOs. The offer drops when the uncertainty becomes too high, whereas the
MAO increases at a faster pace. Among all scenarios, the fair split is still the focal point for both
proposer offers and responder MAOs. Most of the second stage dictator offers are zero, which are
far from the results in a one-shot dictator game, even if there is only a slight chance of winning the
lottery.
To find the best strategies for the game, we also calculate the expected payoffs based on Monte
Carlo simulations. For proposers, offering 50 is the best strategy until the probability reaches as
high as 90%, while responders should demand more. This shows that the players are indeed playing
the optimal strategy.
As shown by the theoretic model, experimental results and Monte Carlo simulations, the dom-
inance of fair offers is not only rational but also optimal. As long as people have the common
belief that other people also care about fairness, the seemingly puzzle of fair split is due to strategic
moves.
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics, all participants
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Age 202 34.43 9.36 18 28 39 67
Female 202 0.46 0.50 0 0 1 1
High school 202 0.27 0.45 0 0 1 1
College degree 202 0.58 0.49 0 0 1 1
Graduate degree 202 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 1
Hates unfair 202 3.18 1.00 1 3 4 5
Likes risk 202 2.83 1.12 1 2 4 5
Risk measure 202 8.90 6.77 0.00 4.24 16.97 16.97
Note: ”Hates unfair” scaled 1-5 is the response to the question of how intolerant the participant consider him-
self/herself is compared to other people.”Likes risk” scaled 1-5 is the subjective measure of risk loving. ”Risk
measure” is the measure derived from (Eckel and Grossman, 2002).
Table 3.2 Offers of all proposers
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Dictator offer 101 34.21 22.26 0 10 50 95
Proposer MAO 101 35.35 17.28 0 25 50 65
Ultimatum offer 101 43.81 11.58 5 40 50 70
10% lottery offer 101 38.56 19.47 0 25 50 100
30% lottery offer 101 42.82 12.50 0 40 50 80
50% lottery offer 101 45.74 13.39 0 40 50 80
70% lottery offer 101 49.80 13.51 10 50 55 100
90% lottery offer 101 52.97 17.40 0 50 60 100
100% lottery offer 101 50.45 14.61 10 50 50 100
Note: ”Proposer MAO” is the proposer’s self-reported minimum acceptable offer in the dictator game
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Table 3.3 Responder MAOs and returning offers, strategy method group
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Ultimatum MAO 51 39.12 19.59 0 30 50 90
10% lottery MAO 51 35.98 19.55 0 30 45 100
30% lottery MAO 51 41.27 19.59 0 35 50 100
50% lottery MAO 51 44.80 20.25 0 37.5 50 100
70% lottery MAO 51 48.04 18.39 0 40 55 100
90% lottery MAO 51 65.59 24.32 0 50 90 100
100% lottery MAO 51 67.94 24.74 20 50 92.5 100
10% returning offer if wins 51 21.18 24.03 0 0 40 100
30% returning offer if wins 51 23.24 23.36 0 0 42.5 100
50% returning offer if wins 51 27.25 22.88 0 2.5 47.5 100
70% returning offer if wins 51 20.49 22.50 0 0 40 100
90% returning offer if wins 51 19.71 26.01 0 0 32.5 100
100% returning offer if wins 51 17.84 24.21 0 0 40 100
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Table 3.4 p-values on Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of proposer offers. H0: same distribution
10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 100%
0% 0.038 0.286 0.817 0.001 0.000 0.038
10% - 0.081 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000
30% - - 0.025 0.007 0.000 0.000
50% - - - 0.081 0.001 0.373
70% - - - - 0.373 0.474
90% - - - - - 0.025
Table 3.5 p-values on Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of responser MAOs. H0: same distribu-
tion
10% 30% 50% 70% 90% 100%
0% 0.723 1.000 0.723 0.119 0.000 0.000
10% - 0.557 0.119 0.002 0.000 0.000
30% - - 0.872 0.073 0.000 0.000
50% - - - 0.723 0.002 0.001
70% - - - - 0.003 0.001
90% - - - - - 0.872
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Table 3.6 Regression of Proposer offers, strategy and direct-resonse methods
Proposer offer
Probability 0.116∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.035) (0.024) (0.068)
Probability2 0.037 −0.120∗∗
(0.028) (0.049)
Proposer MAO 0.092 0.092 0.072 0.072
(0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.069)
Age −0.121 −0.121 −0.126 −0.126
(0.108) (0.108) (0.122) (0.122)
College −3.160 −3.160 −3.152 −3.152
(2.178) (2.179) (2.298) (2.300)
Graduate school −2.841 −2.841 −2.810 −2.810
(2.667) (2.669) (3.157) (3.160)
Female 2.472 2.472 2.512 2.512
(2.111) (2.112) (2.196) (2.198)
Hates unfairness −0.770 −0.770 −0.911 −0.911
(0.845) (0.846) (0.924) (0.925)
Likes risk −2.783∗∗ −2.783∗∗ −3.137∗∗∗ −3.137∗∗∗
(1.158) (1.159) (1.196) (1.197)
Risk measure 0.054 0.054 0.075 0.075
(0.146) (0.146) (0.157) (0.157)
Constant 52.383∗∗∗ 52.836∗∗∗ 52.066∗∗∗ 49.549∗∗∗
(7.149) (7.219) (7.899) (8.288)
Include std. ult. yes yes no no
N 707 707 606 606
Standard errors clustered ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: ”Proposer offer” in cents, ”Probability” in percentage points, ”Hates unfairness” scaled 1-5, ”Likes risk”
scaled 1-5, ”Risk measure” from (Eckel and Grossman, 2002).
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Table 3.7 Regression of responder MAO and return offers upon rejection, strategy method
Responder MAO Responder offer
Probability 0.307∗∗∗ −0.089 0.359∗∗∗ −0.041 −0.050∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(0.041) (0.083) (0.050) (0.097) (0.019) (0.105)
Probability2 0.396∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.109) (0.094)
Age 0.569∗∗ 0.569∗∗ 0.562∗∗ 0.562∗∗ 0.191 0.191
(0.238) (0.238) (0.253) (0.253) (0.261) (0.261)
College −0.646 −0.646 −1.421 −1.421 6.690 6.690
(4.037) (4.043) (3.942) (3.949) (6.162) (6.172)
Graduate 4.783 4.783 3.153 3.153 9.260 9.260
(7.298) (7.308) (7.575) (7.587) (8.783) (8.798)
Female 0.886 0.886 0.772 0.772 −3.742 −3.742
(4.819) (4.826) (4.854) (4.862) (6.427) (6.438)
Hates unfairness −0.046 −0.046 0.222 0.222 −6.321∗∗∗ −6.321∗∗∗
(2.255) (2.258) (2.198) (2.202) (2.437) (2.441)
Likes risk 0.520 0.520 0.484 0.484 −5.650∗∗ −5.650∗∗
(2.866) (2.870) (2.805) (2.810) (2.849) (2.854)
Risk measure 0.205 0.205 0.185 0.185 −1.162∗∗ −1.162∗∗
(0.297) (0.298) (0.308) (0.308) (0.479) (0.480)
Constant 9.920 14.726 6.384 13.894 58.944∗∗∗ 53.746∗∗
(13.274) (13.428) (13.378) (13.509) (20.778) (21.224)
Include std. ult. yes yes no no no no
N 357 357 306 306 306 306
Standard errors clustered ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: ”Proposer offer” in cents, ”Probability” in percentage points, ”Hates unfairness” scaled 1-5, ”Likes risk”
scaled 1-5, ”Risk measure” from (Eckel and Grossman, 2002).
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Table 3.8 Regression of probability to reject, direct-response methods
Offer rejected
Probability 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002 0.003∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Probability2 0.002 0.005∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Age −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
College −0.013 −0.013 −0.011 −0.011
(0.059) (0.059) (0.067) (0.067)
Graduate −0.153∗∗ −0.153∗∗ −0.158∗∗ −0.158∗∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.073) (0.073)
Female −0.024 −0.024 −0.028 −0.028
(0.053) (0.053) (0.058) (0.058)
Hates unfairness 0.048∗ 0.048∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Likes risk 0.028 0.028 0.040 0.040
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028)
Risk measure 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant −0.115 −0.095 −0.173 −0.065
(0.179) (0.195) (0.193) (0.226)
Include std. ult. yes yes no no
N 350 350 300 300
Standard errors clustered ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: ”Probability” in percentage points, ”Hates unfairness” scaled 1-5, ”Likes risk” scaled 1-5, ”Risk measure”
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Figure 3.6 Proposer offer and probability of lottery, strategy method and direct-response;
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Figure 3.8 Responder return offer and probability of lottery, strategy method; Mean offer
in red
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Figure 3.12 Rejection rates and the lottery, strategy method
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Figure 3.13 Proposer offer bootstrapped expected payoffs from simulation, upper quartile
in red
Note: Each point is obtained by multiplying the Monte Carlo mean probability of the offer being
accepted and the remaining share.
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Figure 3.14 Responder MAO and payoff, strategy method
Note: Each point is the Monte Carlo mean payoffs of accepted and rejected. If accepted, the payoff
is the offer above MAO; if rejected, the payoff is $1 times the lottery odds.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Instructions for participants and post game survey
[This is the instruction in ROUND 4 to 8 for Proposers. The instructions differ as the probability
of lottery varies. This page cannot continue within 30 seconds.]
ROUND [4] / [5] / [6] / [7] / [8]
You are given 100 “golden coins” to allocate between you and Responder. You can make the
offer for your opponent to respond.
Now if Responder accepts your offer, the deal is made. If Responder chooses to reject, he/she
can play a lottery with a [30%] / [90%] / [10%] / [70%] / [100%] chance of winning. (In other
words, imagine picking any number from 1 to 10. Winning the lottery means [getting a number
from 1 to 3] / [getting a number from 1 to 9] / [only getting number 1] / [getting a number from
1 to 7] / [getting any number from 1 to 10]/.)
Then, if he/she wins the lottery, the right to allocate the coins shifts to Responder. He/she
can determine the allocation without your agreement, like what you did in round 1. However, if
Responder doesn’t win the lottery, you will both get zero coins.
Remember, Responder can play the lottery only if he/she rejects your offer.
Please think carefully and propose the offer.
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[This is the instruction in ROUND 3 to 7 for Responders in group ”Strategy method”. The
instructions differ as the probability of lottery varies. This page cannot continue within 30 seconds.]
ROUND [3] / [4] / [5] / [6] / [7]
Your opponent, Proposer, is given 100 “golden coins” to allocate between the two of you.
Now if you accept the offer, the deal is made. If you choose to reject, you can play a lottery
with a [30%] / [90%] / [10%] / [70%] / [100%] chance of winning. (In other words, imagine picking
any number from 1 to 10. Winning the lottery means [getting a number from 1 to 3]/ [getting a
number from 1 to 9]/ [only getting number 1]/ [getting a number from 1 to 7]/ [getting any number
from 1 to 10]/.)
Then, if you win the lottery, the right to allocate the coins shifts to you. You can determine
the allocation and your opponent has no choice but to accept it. However, if you don’t win the
lottery, you will both get zero coins.
Remember, you can play the lottery only if you reject the offer.
Please indicate the minimum amount that you demand under this new rule. If Proposer
offers more than this amount, the offer is accepted, otherwise it is seen as rejected and you will
play the lottery.
Your demand at least .
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[This is the instruction in ROUND 3 to 7 for Responders in group ”Direct response”. The
instructions differ as the probability of lottery varies. This page cannot continue within 30 seconds.]
ROUND [3] / [4] / [5] / [6] / [7]
Your opponent, Proposer, is given 100 “golden coins” to allocate between the two of you.
Now if you accept the offer, the deal is made. If you choose to reject, you can play a lottery
with a [30%] / [90%] / [10%] / [70%] / [100%] chance of winning. (In other words, imagine picking
any number from 1 to 10. Winning the lottery means [getting a number from 1 to 3] / [getting
a number from 1 to 9] / [only getting number 1] / [getting a number from 1 to 7] / [getting any
number from 1 to 10].)
Then, if you win the lottery, the right to allocate the coins shifts to you. You can determine
the allocation and your opponent has no choice but to accept it. However, if you don’t win the
lottery, you will both get zero coins.
Remember, you can play the lottery only if you reject the offer.
[Then Responder is informed of the offer.]
Please think carefully and choose to accept or reject the offer.
[If the offer is accepted, this round is over]
[If the offer is rejected, Responder plays the lottery.]
[If Responder wins the lottery]
Congratulations! Now please make the offer.
[If Responder doesn’t win the lottery]
Sorry you didn’t win the lottery, you and Proposer both get zero coins.
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Please fill out the questionnaire to receive your final compensation.
1. Your gender is [Male; Female; Other; Prefer not to answer]
2. Your age is [Can be left blank]
3. Your education level is [Below high school; High school; College; Graduate School; Prefer
not to answer]
4. Your annual income is [Can be left blank]
5. If you were to play a gamble, which one would you choose? [Choose from 1 to 5 or can be
skipped.]
Gamble Event Payoff Probabilities
1 A $10 50%
B $10 50%
2 A $18 50%
B $6 50%
3 A $26 50%
B $2 50%
4 A $34 50%
B $-2 50%
5 A $42 50%
B $-6 50%
6. Which of the following statements do you agree? [Choose from A to E or can be skipped.]
(a) Compared with other people, I’m much more intolerant to being unfairly treated.
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(b) Compared with other people, I’m a little more intolerant to being unfairly treated.
(c) I’m as intolerant as other people in general to being unfairly treated.
(d) Compared with other people, I’m a little less intolerant to being unfairly treated.
(e) Compared with other people, I’m much less intolerant to being unfairly treated.
7. Which of the following statements do you agree? [Choose from A to E or can be skipped.]
(a) I’m much more risk loving than other people.
(b) I’m a little more risk loving than other people.
(c) I’m not different from other people in terms of risk attitude.
(d) I’m a little less risk loving than other people.
(e) I’m much less risk loving than other people.
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CHAPTER 4. GENERAL CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In summary, this dissertation studies dynamic portfolio optimization with reinforcement learn-
ing, and bargaining game with uncertainties.
The essay on portfolio optimization with reinforcement learning provides empirical reference for
practitioners who want to apply these algorithms. We show the convergence property which should
always be considered before applying RL on finance. The results that RL is able to outperform
other strategies is promising, but it takes more in-depth optimizations on practitional constraints
before production. For example, we need to consider various sources of transaction costs, and the
realistic timeline of placing orders. We also find that the learned policies are quite noisy, which
could be problematic when dealing with high dimensional optimization. Thus future work includes
identifying and reducing errors. In addition, we make the trade-off of sample efficiency versus
dynamic assumptions, but we could also assume some transition dynamics to boost learning in the
future work.
The finding of the experiment that fair offers are dominant even when bargaining power is large
is quite interesting. Based on our model, this implies that the belief that most people care about
fairness is robust, and that fairs offers are made due to the fear of rejection. The insight is confirmed
by simulation. Making fairs offers indeed gives the highest expected payoffs for proposers, while
responders should increase their demand as bargaining power increases.
There are limitations of our experimental study and it’s worthwhile to address them in the future
study. Our theoretical model does not take into account the factor of altruism which is evident in
the dictator experiment. It’s also possible to incorporate reciprocity into the model of alternating
offer games. With a more unified model, we could design experiments to separate and identify these
factors. In contrast to the prevailing models in the literature, our theoretical framework is based
on incomplete information game and assumes different utility function depending on the roles.
